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Stock Liquidity and Stock Price Crash Risk 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
We find that stock liquidity increases stock price crash risk. To identify the causal effect, we use 
the decimalization of stock trading as an exogenous shock to liquidity. This effect is increasing 
in a firm’s ownership by transient investors and non-blockholders. Liquid firms have a higher 
likelihood of future bad earnings news releases, which are accompanied by greater selling by 
transient investors, but not blockholders. Our results suggest that liquidity induces managers to 
withhold bad news, fearing that its disclosure will lead to selling by transient investors. 
Eventually, accumulated bad news is released all at once, causing a crash. 
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I. Introduction 
Crash risk in security prices has attracted increasing attention in recent years from a broad 
spectrum of parties, including academics, practitioners, and legislators. Recent high-profile 
corporate scandals (e.g., WorldCom, Enron, Xerox) have triggered a rapidly growing stream of 
research that examines the mechanism of stock price crashes. These studies view the 
accumulation of bad news (“bad news hoarding”) as the key factor in the formation of a stock 
price crash. 1  Incentives such as compensation contracts and career concerns induce firm 
management to conceal bad news from the market in order to preserve inflated share prices (Ball 
(2009), Kothari, Shu, and Wysocki (2009)). As unfavorable information accumulates and 
eventually reaches its upper limit, it is revealed at once, leading to large stock price declines.  
We examine the relation between stock liquidity and stock price crash risk. Stock liquidity is 
generally defined as the ability to trade a significant quantity of a company’s stock at a low cost 
in a short time (Holden, Jacobsen, and Subrahmanyam (2014)). Prior research has offered 
differing views on the impact of stock liquidity on crash risk. Governance theory suggests that 
higher stock liquidity may result in lower crash risk, because it facilitates monitoring of firm 
management by blockholders (e.g., Maug (1998), Edmans (2009)). More effective monitoring by 
blockholders reduces the likelihood of bad news formation due to inefficient investment 
decisions, thereby leading to lower crash risk. Moreover, higher stock liquidity enhances 
information production and informed trading (Holmstrom and Tirole (1993), Holden, Jacobsen, 
and Subrahmanyam (2014)). As stock prices become more informative about firms’ economic 
fundamentals, managers should be less able to accumulate bad news for a substantial period of 
time, which, in turn, should lower crash risk. 
                                                             
1 See, e.g., Jin and Myers (2006), Bleck and Liu (2007), Hutton, Marcus, and Tehranian (2009), Benmelech, Kandel, 
and Veronesi (2010), Kim, Li, and Zhang (2011a, 2011b), and Callen and Fang (2014). We review the relevant 
literature in greater detail in Section II.A.  
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However, a competing viewpoint is that higher stock liquidity results in higher crash risk. 
Prior research has advanced two potential mechanisms for this effect. First, short-termism theory 
suggests that, due to low trading costs, higher liquidity can attract more transient institutional 
investors with short investment horizons and excessive focus on firms’ short-term performance 
(Porter (1992), Fang, Tian, and Tice (2014)). To avoid the downward stock price pressure exerted 
by these investors, managers may withhold bad news to inflate short-term earnings. Such an 
effect will lead to accumulation of bad news over time. Eventually, accumulated bad news is 
released all at once, triggering “cutting and running” selling by transient investors and causing a 
crash. Second, governance theory also suggests that higher stock liquidity can facilitate 
blockholder exit (e.g., Edmans (2009)) when bad news is made public.2 Heavy selling pressure 
from blockholders can magnify market responses to negative information about firms and cause 
stock prices to plunge.  
In sum, prior research has offered competing views as to whether stock liquidity mitigates or 
exacerbates crash risk. Therefore, it is ultimately an empirical question as to which effect 
prevails. Using a large sample of U.S. firms for 1993–2010, we find strong support for the latter 
perspective. We use relative effective spread as our primary measure of stock liquidity (e.g., 
Fang, Noe, and Tice (2009)), and we capture crash risk using the likelihood of extremely low 
firm-specific weekly stock returns and negative skewness of stock returns (e.g., Chen, Hong, 
and Stein (2001), Hutton, Marcus, and Tehranian (2009)). We document that stocks with higher 
liquidity (i.e., lower relative effective spreads) are more susceptible to crash risk, as reflected in a 
higher subsequent probability of extremely low returns and more negatively skewed returns. The 
                                                             
2 Note that even though liquidity facilitates monitoring of firm management by blockholders, blockholder exit can 
still occur and result in crashes. Specifically, assume that firm value is determined by managerial efforts and 
exogenous shocks. Greater liquidity leads to a greater threat of exit and induces managers to exert greater efforts, 
leading to more efficient investment decisions and a lower likelihood of bad news formation. However, bad news 
can still happen due to negative shocks (e.g. bad industry conditions). Greater liquidity may facilitate blockholders’ 
exit when bad news comes out, if blockholders are more capable of processing news than other investors.  
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effect is economically meaningful–increasing stock liquidity by one standard deviation increases 
the probability of a future stock price crash by 0.027, and raises negative skewness of stock 
returns by 0.047. Our results are robust to alternative measures of crash risk and stock liquidity.  
We also perform several tests to address endogeneity concerns. Among these tests, we utilize 
the decimalization of stock trading as a positive exogenous shock to stock liquidity (e.g., Fang, 
Noe, and Tice (2009)). In 2001, the NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ began quoting and trading 
stocks in decimal increments (as opposed to increments of one-sixteenth of $1). Chordia, Roll, 
and Subrahmanyam (2008) show that after decimalization, firms experienced a substantial 
increase in stock liquidity. We document a significant increase in crash risk following the year of 
decimalization. Additional analysis reveals that the increase in crash risk is more pronounced for 
low-priced stocks, the liquidity of which is more affected by decimalization (Edmans, Fang, and 
Zur (2013)). To further ensure that the increase in crash risk is driven by decimalization instead 
of other confounding events in 2001, we compare the changes in crash risk around 2001 in the 
U.S. with those in major non-U.S. markets, which did not experience an event comparable to 
decimalization. We find that the change in crash risk is significantly more positive for the U.S. 
market. The entirety of these results confirms the causal effect of stock liquidity on crash risk. 
Having established the sign of and causality for the stock liquidity-crash risk relation, we 
further explore its potential mechanisms. As discussed above, such an effect can occur either 
through the transient investor channel (i.e., high stock liquidity exacerbates short-termism-
induced bad news hoarding and subsequent “cutting and running” selling by transient 
institutional investors when bad news is released), or through the blockholder channel (i.e., with 
higher stock liquidity, blockholders, as informed investors, can sell their holdings more 
aggressively upon bad news). Because higher liquidity implies a lower price impact for a given 
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sale volume, both channels implicitly require that in response to bad news releases, the selling 
pressure from investors (transient investors or blockholders) must be large enough in order to 
have a very negative price impact on liquid stocks.  
We conduct several tests to assess the relative importance of the two channels in shaping the 
stock liquidity-crash risk relation. Collectively, the findings offer strong support for the transient 
investor channel, but not for the blockholder channel. Specifically, we document that the effect 
of stock liquidity on crash risk is stronger for firms with a higher proportion of transient 
institutional ownership, but not for those with higher blockholder ownership. Further, we find 
that crash weeks are characterized by a higher intensity of very bad earnings news releases (e.g., 
extremely low unexpected earnings and/or negative management earnings guidance) than non-
crash weeks, and that higher liquidity is positively associated with the intensity of subsequent 
unexpected very bad earnings news releases. These results are consistent with the transient 
investor channel, which implies accumulation of bad news over time, until the point when all bad 
news is released at once and crash occurs. Finally, we examine the level of institutional selling 
during crash weeks, and find it to be higher for firms with higher liquidity. Further analysis 
reveals that the positive effect of stock liquidity on abnormal institutional selling during crash 
weeks is stronger for firms with higher transient institutional ownership, but not for those with 
higher blockholder ownership. This result indicates that the abnormal institutional selling for 
liquid stocks during crash weeks is driven primarily by the “cutting and running” exit of transient 
institutions, instead of blockholders’ exit. Taken together, our findings imply that stock liquidity 
increases crash risk not only because high liquidity increases short-termism pressure and induces 
managers to withhold bad news ex ante, but also because it facilitates the exit of transient 
institutions, thereby magnifying stock price responses to bad news releases ex post. 
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Our paper contributes to the existing literature in several ways. First, we contribute to the 
stream of research that examines the determinants of stock price crash risk. There are growing 
concerns among academics and legislators that stock liquidity can cause instability in the capital 
markets (e.g., O’Hara (2004)).3 Our findings provide firm-level evidence that these concerns are 
valid. In this context, our findings should be relevant for regulators, because stock liquidity can 
be altered by financial market regulations and securities laws (e.g., O’Hara (2004), Chordia, 
Roll, and Subrahmanyam (2008)). Furthermore, identifying stock liquidity as an important 
predictor of extreme return outcomes could be useful in risk management applications that focus 
on tail events and option pricing (e.g., Berkowitz and O’Brien (2002), Cohen et al. (2014)).  
Second, our study extends prior research that examines the effect of stock liquidity on 
managerial short-termism. Studies such as Fang, Tian, and Tice (2014) focus primarily on how 
liquidity-induced short-term pressures can distort investment decisions. We provide new 
evidence from the context of bad news hoarding activities. Such activities avert timely disclosure 
of bad news, and can thus avoid disappointing transient institutional investors in the short run. 
But they can ultimately result in a “pile up” of bad news, and thus expose firms to higher crash 
risk in the long run.  
Third, our results contribute to the market microstructure literature that examines the links 
between stock liquidity and stock price declines (e.g., Bernardo and Welch (2003), Brunnermeier 
and Pedersen (2009)). These studies suggest that substantial declines in stock prices can result in 
decreasing liquidity. Our findings imply that causality may also run in the opposite direction 
from stock liquidity to stock price crashes. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II reviews the relevant literature 
                                                             
3 Specifically, O’Hara (2004, p. 1) points out that “there is debate as to whether liquidity fosters or retards financial 
market stability. This divergence reflects a deeper disagreement as to whether liquidity is best viewed as a virtue or a 
vice.”  
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and develops our empirical predictions. Section III describes our data, variables, and summary 
statistics. Section IV reports our main findings regarding the effect of stock liquidity on crash 
risk, while Section V examines its potential mechanisms. Section VI concludes. 
 
II. Related Literature and Empirical Predictions  
A. Stock Price Crash Risk: A Brief Review of Prior Research 
Corporate managers often possess higher levels of private information about firm operations, 
asset values, and future prospects than outside investors. As managers’ decisions to disclose or 
conceal their private information are governed by a variety of incentives, their disclosure 
preferences are not perfectly aligned with those of outside investors (e.g., Healy and Palepu 
(2001), Kothari, Shu, and Wysocki (2009)). In particular, managers may tend to strategically 
withhold or delay the disclosure of bad news, gambling that it will ultimately be offset by 
subsequent good news. A number of studies suggest this tendency arises from managerial 
incentives such as career concerns (Kothari, Shu, and Wysocki (2009)), desire to maintain the 
esteem of peers (Ball (2009)), and equity-based incentives (Kim, Li, and Zhang (2011b)).4 The 
survey evidence in Graham, Harvey, and Rajgopal (2005) also suggests Chief Financial Officers 
(CFOs) delay bad news disclosure in the hope that firm status will improve before the required 
release date, which averts the need to disclose unfavorable information to the market. 
However, bad news hoarding by firm management engenders crash risk, because the amount 
of bad news a manager is willing or able to withhold is limited (Jin and Myers (2006)). As a 
sufficiently long run of bad news or bad performance accumulates and reaches a certain tipping 
point, managerial incentives for withholding bad news collapse and a large amount of negative 
                                                             
4 For additional analyses of the channels through which equity-based incentives can lead to strategic timing of 
corporate news releases, see Aboody and Kasznik (2000), Daines, McQueen, and Schonlau (2014), and Edmans et 
al. (2014). 
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firm-specific information  comes out in one fell swoop, resulting in a crash.  
Several theoretical studies link bad news hoarding to crash risk using an agency theory 
framework. Jin and Myers (2006) argue that, when a firm is not completely transparent, its 
managers can capture a portion of cash flows in ways not perceived by outside investors. To 
protect their jobs, managers may absorb downside risk and losses caused by temporary firm 
performance by hiding firm-specific bad news until a crash occurs. Bleck and Liu (2007) argue 
that managers may prefer to keep bad projects for private benefits. To prevent investors and 
directors from taking timely abandonment actions, they may hide negative information using 
historical cost accounting.  But the poor performance of bad projects accumulates over time and 
eventually materializes, leading to crashes. Using a hidden action model, Benmelech, Kandel, 
and Veronesi (2010) show that stock-based compensation induces managers to conceal bad news 
about future growth options, which results in inflated stock prices and subsequent crashes.  
As these theoretical studies suggest, bad news hoarding and crash risk are driven by the 
conflicts of interest between managers and outside investors, which cause managers to hang on 
to bad projects or conceal bad performance to benefit themselves at the expense of shareholders. 
Consistent with these theoretical arguments, recent empirical studies provide strong support for 
the bad news hoarding theory of crash risk.5  
B. Stock Liquidity and Crash Risk 
Prior research suggests that stock price crash risk can occur when a large amount of bad 
news that was previously withheld by firm management is released at once. This implies that 
stock liquidity can impact crash risk by affecting one or more of the following three items: the 
                                                             
5 These studies show that factors such as corporate tax avoidance (Kim, Li, and Zhang (2011a)), CFO’s equity 
incentives (Kim, Li, and Zhang (2011b)), CEO overconfidence (Kim, Wang, and Zhang (2014)), opaque financial 
reports (Hutton, Marcus, and Tehranian (2009)), international financial reporting standards (DeFond et al. (2015)), 
and religiosity (Callen and Fang (2014)) are associated with crash risk in a manner consistent with managers’ 
tendencies to conceal bad news. 
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likelihood of bad news formation (i.e., the likelihood that bad news arises due to managerial 
underperformance or a negative shock), the extent of managerial bad news hoarding (i.e., 
whether, once bad news arises, it is released or hoarded by managers), and the strength of the 
market response when bad news is revealed. Prior research on stock liquidity has offered two 
relevant theories on crash risk: governance theory and short-termism theory. Governance theory 
predicts that higher stock liquidity encourages investors’ information production and informed 
trading, and enhances large shareholders’ (i.e., blockholders’) incentives and capability to 
monitor firms. Short-termism theory predicts that higher stock liquidity attracts transient 
investors and induces managers to engage in short-termist behavior. In what follows, we develop 
the predictions of these theories regarding the effects of stock liquidity on the three items 
associated with crash risk. For convenience, we summarize the predictions in Figure 1. 
[Insert Figure 1 about here] 
We first discuss the links between stock liquidity and the likelihood of bad news formation. 
Governance theory suggests that higher stock liquidity enhances blockholders’ monitoring of 
firm management, thus preventing managers from undertaking value-destroying projects. This 
reduces the likelihood of bad news formation. For example, Kahn and Winton (1998) and Maug 
(1998) show that stock liquidity encourages large shareholders’ intervention through facilitating 
the accumulation of shares and increasing profits from intervention.6 A more recent stream of 
research emphasizes how stock liquidity can strengthen blockholder governance via exit, namely, 
selling a firm’s stock based on private information (e.g., Edmans (2009), Edmans and Manso 
(2011)). Because managerial compensation is typically linked to stock prices, ex post, managers 
suffer from low stock prices caused by informed blockholders selling shares. Therefore, ex ante, 
                                                             
6 Specifically, higher stock liquidity makes blockholders more able to purchase additional shares (prior to 
intervention) at a price that does not yet reflect the benefits of intervention. Consequently, higher stock liquidity 
increases blockholder’s profits from intervention, and encourages blockholders’ intervention. 
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the threat of blockholder exit induces managers to act in the best interest of shareholders, 
deterring managers from engaging in value-destructive behavior (Admati and Pfleiderer (2009)). 
Next, we outline potential interplays between stock liquidity and the extent of bad news 
hoarding by firm management. Governance theory predicts that higher stock liquidity alleviates 
bad news hoarding. Holmstrom and Tirole (1993) show that the marginal value of information 
acquisition goes up with stock liquidity because informed investors can profit from private 
information by trading against liquidity traders. Therefore, higher stock liquidity increases 
investors’ information production, enhances informed trading, and improves the information 
content of stock prices.7 In addition, Edmans (2009) argues that higher stock liquidity encourages 
costly information acquisition and more aggressive trading on private information by 
blockholders. By making stock prices more informative about firms’ economic fundamentals, 
enhanced information discovery and informed trading can weaken managers’ ability to “pile up” 
bad news for a substantial period of time. 
On the other hand, short-termism theory implies that stock liquidity exacerbates bad news 
hoarding by inducing short-termism pressures. Porter (1992) notes that a large percentage of U.S. 
institutional investors are transient institutions, chasing short-term price appreciation and exiting 
in response to low reported earnings. High liquidity stocks attract transient investors because low 
trading costs facilitate their entry and exit (e.g., Fang, Tian, and Tice (2014)). Bushee (1998, 
2001) shows that transient institutions tend to favor firms with greater expected short-term 
earnings, pressuring managers into an overly short-term focus. In response, short-term-focused 
managers may “pile up” bad news to avert the hit to reported earnings and avoid the negative 
impact of transient investors’ selling pressure on current stock prices. Consistent with this, 
                                                             
7 Consistent with this, prior studies document that stock liquidity reduces stock mispricing (Chordia, Roll, and 
Subrahmanyam (2008), Boehmer and Kelley (2009)), increases the use of equity-based compensation (Jayaraman 
and Milbourn (2012)), and reduces reliance on board independence (Ferreira, Ferreira, and Raposo (2011)). 
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Matsumoto (2002) documents that firms with higher transient institutional ownership are more 
likely to manage earnings upward to meet earnings targets or exceed analyst forecasts.  
Finally, we explore the impact of stock liquidity on the strength of market responses to bad 
news. Higher stock liquidity reduces the exit costs for unhappy stockholders (e.g., Bhide (1993)), 
and thus amplifies market responses to unfavorable information. The short-termism theory of 
stock liquidity implies that higher stock liquidity should magnify the response of transient 
institutional investors to bad news releases, inducing a “cutting and running” type of selling that 
can lead to crashes. However, governance theory’s predictions about how liquidity impacts 
market responses to bad news releases are less clear. To the extent that informed investors trade 
primarily on private rather than public information, their trading responses to public bad news 
releases should be weak since the news is already incorporated in stock prices, especially when 
the bad news is interpreted unambiguously by investors. On the other hand, if information 
advantage makes blockholders more capable of processing bad news disclosures than other 
investors, we would expect to observe strong stock selling by blockholders upon bad news 
releases. Edmans (2009, 2014) shows that stock liquidity facilitates initial block formation and 
allows blockholders to trade more aggressively based on their information. As a result, 
blockholders’  exit may also amplify the market responses to bad news and cause stock price 
crashes.8 
To summarize, there are competing predictions regarding the effect of stock liquidity on 
crash risk. On the one hand, higher stock liquidity can reduce the likelihood of bad news 
formation by enhancing blockholder governance through either intervention or the threat of exit. 
It can also constrain managers’ ability to “pile up” bad news by encouraging information 
                                                             
8 It is plausible that if blockholders’ exit is sufficiently strong, it may outweigh the negative effect of stock liquidity 
on bad news formation through the threat of exit, thereby turning the relation between stock liquidity and crash risk 
into a positive one. 
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production and improving stock price informativeness. Further, higher stock liquidity can 
mitigate trading responses of informed investors to bad news releases. These arguments suggest 
that higher stock liquidity results in lower crash risk. On the other hand, higher stock liquidity 
can also attract more transient institutional investors whose short-term focus pressures managers 
to “pile up” bad news, and facilitate “cutting and running” selling by transient investors when 
accumulated bad news is, eventually, released all at once. Further, it can also magnify the market 
responses to bad news releases by facilitating blockholders’ exit upon bad news. These 
arguments predict that higher stock liquidity results in higher crash risk. Therefore, it is not clear 
a priori which effect will prevail, and there is a need for empirical evidence to inform theory.  
 
III. Variables and Data 
A. Sample Selection 
We obtain our data from multiple sources. Data for constructing the stock liquidity measure 
comes from the Trade and Quote database (TAQ). Stock prices and returns come from the Center 
for Research in Security Prices (CRSP). We obtain firm financial information from the merged 
Compustat/CRSP database, institutional holdings data from Thomson Reuters Institutional 
Holdings (13f), institutional investor classification data from Brian Bushee’s website, 9  and 
earnings forecasts and guidance data from the Institutional Brokers’ Estimate System (IBES).  
Following Kim, Li, and Zhang (2011a), we exclude observations with negative book value 
of equity, with year-end stock prices less than $1, or with fewer than 26 weeks of stock return 
data. We further exclude observations with insufficient information for constructing the crash 
risk measures, and those with missing values for stock liquidity or control variables. Following 
common practice, we winsorize all variables (except the crash dummy) in regression analyses at 
                                                             
9 http://acct.wharton.upenn.edu/faculty/bushee/IIclass.html. 
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both the 1st and 99th percentiles to mitigate the effect of outliers. Our final sample consists of 
58,533 firm-year observations for 9,285 U.S. firms for 1993–2010.  
B. Crash Risk Measures 
To construct our crash risk measures, we build on Jin and Myers (2006) who define a stock 
price crash as a remote, negative outlier in a firm’s residual stock return. Accordingly, we 
compute residual stock returns and measure crash risk using two common metrics: the crash 
dummy, and negative skewness. Specifically, we first calculate firm-specific weekly returns from 
the following expanded index model regression for each firm-year (Hutton, Marcus, and 
Tehranian (2009)):  
(1)                  , 0 1 , 1 2 , 1 3 , 4 , 5 , 1 6 , 1 ,i t mkt t ind t mkt t ind t mkt t ind t i tr r r r r r r                           
where ri,t is the return on stock i in week t, rmkt,t is the return on the CRSP value-weighted market 
index, rind,t is the return on the Fama and French’s (1993) value-weighted industry index, and εi,t 
is the error term. We include the lead and lag market and industry index returns to account for 
non-synchronous trading (Dimson (1979)). Following prior research (e.g., Chen, Hong, and Stein 
(2001), Hutton, Marcus, and Tehranian (2009)), we estimate the firm-specific weekly return, Wi,t, 
as the natural log of one plus the regression residual (i.e., Wi,t =ln(1+εi,t)). We obtain similar 
(untabulated) results by estimating crash risk measures using raw residual returns. 
The first measure, crash dummy (CRASH), equals 1 if a firm experiences one or more crash 
weeks over the fiscal year, and zero otherwise. Following Hutton, Marcus, and Tehranian (2009), 
we define crash weeks as those when a firm experiences firm-specific weekly returns that are 
3.09 standard deviations below the mean firm-specific weekly returns over the fiscal year. The 
number 3.09 is chosen to generate a 0.1% frequency in the normal distribution. In Section IV.C, 
we experiment with alternative definitions of crash weeks and obtain similar results. 
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We compute our second measure, negative skewness (NSKEW), by following Chen, Hong, 
and Stein (2001) and Kim, Li, and Zhang (2011a, 2011b). NSKEW for each firm-year is the ratio 
of the third moment of firm-specific weekly returns over the standard deviation of firm-specific 
weekly returns raised to the third power, and then multiplied by 1, as shown in Equation (2). A 
higher value of NSKEW implies a more left-skewed return distribution, and thus a more ‘‘crash-
prone” stock. 
(2)                        
3/ 2 3 2 3/ 2
, . ,[ ( 1) ]/[( 1)( 2)( ) ]i t i t i tNSKEW n n W n n W       
 
C. Stock Liquidity Measure  
Our primary measure of stock liquidity, the relative effective spread, is generally considered 
to be among the best liquidity measures (e.g., Fang, Noe, and Tice (2009), Fang, Tian, and Tice 
(2014)). It is constructed using high-frequency trading data, and is often used as the benchmark 
for liquidity measures constructed using low-frequency data (e.g., Hasbrouck, (2009), Goyenko, 
Holden, and Trzcinka (2009)). It is the ratio of the absolute value of the difference between the 
trade price and the midpoint of the bid-ask quote over the trade price. The data is from Vanderbilt 
University's Financial Markets Research Centre which computes daily relative effective spread 
for a given stock as the trade-weighted average of the relative effective spreads of all trades for a 
given stock during the day, as per TAQ. To obtain the annual relative effective spread, we take 
the arithmetic mean of the daily spreads over the firm’s fiscal year. Because a higher relative 
effective spread indicates lower stock liquidity, we define stock liquidity (LIQ) as the annual 
relative effective spread multiplied by 1. For ease of interpretation, we multiply stock liquidity 
by 100. The robustness tests described in Section IV.C show that our findings are robust to 
alternative liquidity measures. 
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D. Control Variables 
Our selection of control variables follows prior literature. We use stock return volatility 
(SIGMA), past stock returns (RET), and past stock turnover (DTURN), because Chen, Hong, and 
Stein (2001) show that these variables are positively associated with crash risk. We control for 
firm size (SIZE) using market capitalization, and growth opportunities using the market-to-book 
ratio (MB) because Chen, Hong, and Stein (2001) and Hutton, Marcus, and Tehranian (2009) 
find that these two variables are positively correlated with crash risk. We further control for 
leverage (LEV) and return on assets (ROA), because Hutton, Marcus, and Tehranian (2009) 
document their negative correlations with crash risk. We include discretionary accruals (ACCM) 
as Hutton, Marcus, and Tehranian (2009) show that firms with higher levels of ACCM are more 
prone to crashes.10 Finally, we control for lagged NSKEW since Chen, Hong, and Stein (2001) 
find that stock return skewness is persistent over time. Detailed definitions of these variables are 
in Appendix A.  
E. Descriptive Statistics 
Table 1 reports the number of observations by year, as well as the mean values of crash 
dummy, negative skewness, stock liquidity, and firm-specific stock returns on crash weeks for 
each year. The mean crash dummy (the proportion of firms experiencing at least one crash over 
the year) is higher during the 2000s than in the 1990s, possibly because of the dot-com bubble 
burst and the recession of 2008–2009. A similar trend is observed for mean negative skewness. 
Mean stock liquidity increased from -1.21 in 1993 to -0.345 in 2010, suggesting a substantial 
improvement in market liquidity over our sample period. The mean firm-specific weekly stock 
                                                             
10 Based on these results, Hutton, Marcus, and Tehranian (2009) conclude that opacity of firm’s financial statements 
allows managers to obscure negative information about underlying fundamentals. However, since financial 
statement’s bottom line is only one of many ways of conveying information (Lambert, 2010), managers may use a 
variety of methods other than managing firm’s accruals to withhold bad news from investors (Kim, Li, and Zhang 
(2011b)). 
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return on crash weeks is -24.7%. Furthermore, (untabulated) results show that 95% of firms in 
our sample that experienced stock price crashes had firm-specific returns lower than or equal to -
7.8% during crash weeks. These observations suggest that our crash risk definition captures 
substantially negative events for firms’ stock prices. 
 [Insert Table 1 about here] 
Table 2 presents the summary statistics and the Pearson correlation matrix of variables. 
Panel A shows that, on average, 18.8% of firm-years in our sample experience one or more crash 
weeks during the fiscal year. This and other summary statistics are generally in line with those 
reported in prior research (e.g., Hutton, Marcus, and Tehranian (2009), Kim, Li, and Zhang 
(2011a, 2011b)). Panel B shows that the two crash risk measures are significantly correlated. 
Moreover, both crash dummy and negative skewness are positively correlated with stock 
liquidity. 
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
 
IV. Stock Liquidity and Crash Risk: Main Results 
A. Univariate Analysis 
We begin by plotting crash dummy and negative skewness against stock liquidity. First, we 
divide the entire sample into deciles by one-year lagged stock liquidity. We then calculate the 
mean values of the two crash risk measures for each liquidity decile. Finally, we plot the mean 
values against deciles from lowest to highest. Panel A of Figure 2 shows an increasing trend in 
the crash dummy as liquidity increases. We observe a similar trend for negative skewness. For 
both measures, the difference between the mean values of crash risk for firms in the 1st versus 
10th deciles of stock liquidity is statistically significant (smallest t-statistic = 13.90). 
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Because stock liquidity in our sample is significantly correlated with firm size, we repeat 
our analysis using residual stock liquidity deciles to ensure that the pattern in Panel A is not 
driven by the high correlation between stock liquidity and firm size. Residual stock liquidity is 
the regression residual of stock liquidity against firm size (SIZE). The graph presented in Panel B 
of Figure 2 shows that both crash risk measures increase monotonically with residual stock 
liquidity. The difference between the mean values of crash risk for the firms in the 1st versus 10th 
deciles is statistically significant (smallest t-statistic = 10.66). Collectively, these findings 
provide preliminary evidence for the positive relation between stock liquidity and crash risk. 
Although interesting, these unconditional relations require more refined multivariate tests, which 
we turn to next. 
[Insert Figure 2 about here] 
B. Regression Analysis 
In this section, we perform regression analyses to examine the relation between stock 
liquidity and crash risk. The regression specifications are as follows: 
(3a)       , 0 1 , 1 2 , 1 3 , 1 4 , 1 5 , 1
6 , 1 7 , 1 8 , 1 9 , 1 10 , 1 ,
i t i t i t i t i t i t
i t i t i t i t i t t i i t
CRASH LIQ NSKEW SIGMA RET DTURN
SIZE MB LEV ROA ACCM Yr Ind
     
     
    
    
     
       
       
(3b)       , 0 1 , 1 2 , 1 3 , 1 4 , 1 5 , 1
6 , 1 7 , 1 8 , 1 9 , 1 10 , 1 ,
i t i t i t i t i t i t
i t i t i t i t i t t i i t
NSKEW LIQ NSKEW SIGMA RET DTURN
SIZE MB LEV ROA ACCM Yr Ind
     
     
    
    
     
       
     
Here, i denotes the firm, t denotes the year, Yrt denotes the year fixed-effects, Indi denotes the 
industry fixed-effects based on two-digit SIC codes, and εi,t is the error term. We estimate 
Equation (3a) using the logit model and Equation (3b) using ordinary least squares (OLS). Both 
z- and t-statistics are computed using standard errors adjusted for heteroskedasticity and 
clustering at the firm level. Because all explanatory variables are lagged one year, the sample 
size for these tests is reduced from 58,533 (as in Table 1) to 48,176 observations. 
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Table 3 gives the baseline regression results. Column (1) shows the results for crash dummy. 
The coefficient of stock liquidity is positive and statistically significant (z-statistic = 7.439), 
suggesting that firms with higher liquidity are more likely to experience a stock price crash in the 
future. The marginal effect of stock liquidity on crash dummy (evaluated at the mean values of 
the explanatory variables) is 0.033, suggesting that a one-standard-deviation rise in stock 
liquidity (i.e., 0.826) is associated with a 0.826 × 0.033 = 0.027 increase in crash probability. 
Given that our sample mean of crash dummy is 0.188, the effect of stock liquidity on crash risk 
is not only statistically significant, but also economically meaningful. 
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
Column (2) shows the results for negative skewness. The coefficient of stock liquidity is 
positive and statistically significant (t-statistic = 9.008), which suggests that future stock returns 
of firms with higher liquidity are, on average, more negatively skewed. In terms of economic 
significance, increasing stock liquidity by one standard deviation (0.826) raises negative 
skewness by 0.826 × 0.057 = 0.047. To put this in perspective, a one-standard-deviation increase 
in MB, which has been shown by prior studies (e.g., Cheng, Hong, and Stein (2001)) to be one of 
the most important determinants of crash risk, increases negative skewness by 4.478 × 0.004 = 
0.018. Overall, these findings further confirm a positive and significant association between 
stock liquidity and crash risk.  
The results for control variables are largely consistent with prior literature. Specifically, 
crash risk is positively associated with past stock returns, stock turnover, MB, stock return 
volatility, and discretionary accruals. It is negatively correlated with firm profitability. 
Untabulated statistics show that the largest variance inflation factor (VIF) is below 5, suggesting 
that multicollinearity does not pose a serious problem in our setting (O'Brien (2007)). 
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C. Robustness Tests 
We conduct further analyses to ensure our baseline results are robust to alternative model 
specifications and variable definitions. We report the results in Table 4. For brevity, we only 
tabulate the coefficients of stock liquidity. 
We begin by considering alternative measures of crash risk, and conduct three sets of 
analyses. In the first set, we use alternative firm-specific thresholds to identify crash weeks. The 
purpose is to mitigate the concern that our results may be driven by a particular threshold (3.09 
standard deviations) used in defining crash risk dummy. Specifically, we define crash weeks as 
those weeks during which a firm experiences firm-specific weekly returns that are 3.5, 4, or 4.5 
standard deviations below the mean firm-specific weekly returns over the fiscal year. In the 
second set, we use general instead of firm-specific thresholds to identify crash weeks. Firm-
specific thresholds are subject to the concern that, for example, 3.09 standard deviations below 
mean returns may not be economically significant enough to be a crash for stocks with low 
volatility. To mitigate this concern, we alternatively define crash weeks as those during which 
firms experience firm-specific weekly returns that are below -10%, -15%, or -20%. Finally, we 
consider the number of crash weeks within a fiscal year as an alternative measure of crash risk. 
While crash dummy has been widely used in prior research (e.g., Hutton, Marcus, and Tehranian 
(2009), Kim, Li, and Zhang (2011a, 2011b)), it is expected to have less variation in the 
outcomes—and thus, to be less informative— than the number of crash weeks over a fiscal year. 
However, our (untabulated) results indicate that the number of observations with more than one 
crash week is very small (less than 0.6% of the sample), consistent with the notion that crash 
dummy captures a rare negative stock event. Thus, using the number of crashes within a year as 
the dependent variable in the OLS regression is empirically very similar to estimating a binary 
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choice model using crash dummy as the dependent variable. Nevertheless, for completeness we 
re-estimate Equation 3(a) using OLS and using the number of crashes as the dependent variable. 
The results of these tests are tabulated in Panel A of Table 4. For each test, the coefficient for 
stock liquidity is positive and significant (smallest z-statistic for the crash dummy = 6.869, and 
the t-statistic for the number of crashes = 7.648), suggesting that our findings are robust to 
alternative measures of crash risk. 
Next, we consider the possibility that the documented stock liquidity-crash risk relation is 
driven by our choice of stock liquidity measure. To alleviate this concern, we consider the 
following alternative measures of stock liquidity: Amihud’s (2002) price impact measure, 
Hasbrouck’s (2009) implicit bid-ask spread measure, and Lesmond’s (2005) percentage of zero 
daily returns measure.11 We again multiply each measure by 1 so that higher values imply 
higher liquidity. The results are in Panel B of Table 4. The coefficient of stock liquidity is 
positive and significant for each liquidity measure in both crash dummy and negative skewness 
regressions (smallest z-statistic = 6.439, and smallest t-statistic = 7.508). This suggests our 
findings are robust across alternative measures of stock liquidity.  
 [Insert Table 4 about here] 
For completeness, we conduct several additional (untabulated) tests. The results show that 
our findings are robust to using down-up volatility as an alternative measure of crash risk (Chen, 
Hong, and Stein (2001)),12  excluding the recent financial crisis (2008–2009) to address the 
                                                             
11 Amihud’s (2002) price impact measure captures the stock price changes per $ millions of trading volume. The 
implicit bid-ask spread is the Gibbs sampler estimate of the square root of the negative daily autocorrelation of 
individual stock returns. Implicit bid-ask spread data is from Joel Hasbrouck's homepage: 
http://people.stern.nyu.edu/jhasbrou/Research/. The percentage of zero daily returns is the number of trading days 
with zero daily returns and positive trading volume, divided by the number of trading days over the fiscal year.   
12 We calculate the down-up volatility measure as per Chen, Hong, and Stein (2001). For each firm-year, we divide 
weeks into “down” (weeks with firm-specific returns below the annual mean) and “up” (those with firm-specific 
returns above the annual mean). We then calculate the standard deviation of firm-specific weekly returns for the two 
subsamples separately, and define down-up volatility as the log of the ratio of standard deviation on down weeks to 
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concern that our results may be driven by the excess market volatility during that period, and 
using the post-SOX sample period (2003-2010) to control for changes in the regulatory 
environment (Hutton, Marcus, and Tehranian (2009)).  
D. Endogeneity 
While we document a strong positive association between stock liquidity and crash risk, the 
results are potentially subject to endogeneity arising from either omitted variables, or reverse 
causality running from crash risk to liquidity. We perform several tests to alleviate these 
concerns. In Panel C of Table 4, we augment our baseline regression models by including firm 
fixed effects to account for potential firm-specific time-invariant omitted variables. We obtain 
qualitatively similar results. Next, we modify our baseline regression models by including a set 
of additional control variables that could be correlated with both stock liquidity and crash risk. 
We control for high-frequency trading to mitigate the concern that its rise in recent years could 
affect both stock liquidity and crash risk. We follow Zhang (2010) in constructing this measure. 
We also control for the effects of tax avoidance and executive equity incentives on crash risk (as 
documented by Kim, Li, and Zhang (2011a, 2011b)). We include the estimated probability of 
engaging in a tax shelter based on Wilson’s (2009) prediction model, and CFO option sensitivity 
to stock price changes estimated following Core and Guay (2002).13 Prior research suggests that 
managers’ propensity to hoard bad news — and thus crash risk — could be related to firms’ 
corporate governance and auditor characteristics (Beasley (1996), Dunn and Mayhew (2004)).  
Therefore, we include board independence, the CEO duality dummy, the big auditor dummy, and 
                                                                                                                                                                                                    
that on up weeks. The coefficient of stock liquidity remains positive and significant (t-statistic = 9.681). 
13 We control for CFO option incentives following Kim, Li, and Zhang (2011b). They show that CFO option 
incentives dominate CEO option incentives in determining future crash risk and conclude that CFOs are more 
influential in firms' bad news hoarding decisions. As a robustness test, we include CEO (rather than CFO) option 
sensitivity to stock price changes as an additional control. The results (untabulated) remain qualitatively the same. 
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the auditor industry specialization dummy as additional controls.14 Furthermore, we include a 
high litigation industry membership dummy to control for litigation risk (Matsumoto (2002)), 
and a KMV distance-to-default measure constructed as per Bharath and Shumway (2008) to 
control for financial distress risk. Because of missing values for these additional controls, we 
perform our analysis with a much smaller sample of 7,674 firm-year observations. Our main 
results, however, are unaffected. 
To further address endogeneity concerns, we follow prior studies (e.g., Fang, Noe, and Tice 
(2009), Bharath, Jayaraman, and Nagar (2013)) and use a decimalization event as a quasi-natural 
experiment. On January 29, 2001, the NYSE and AMEX began quoting and trading stocks in 
decimal increments (as opposed to increments of one-sixteenth of $1). The NASDAQ also 
changed its tick size to decimals between March 12, 2001 and April 9, 2001. Prior research (e.g., 
Chordia, Roll, and Subrahmanyam (2008)) shows that decimalization resulted in increase in 
stock liquidity, making it an appealing framework to examine the effect of stock liquidity on 
crash risk.  
We examine the changes in crash risk around decimalization using regression analysis. We 
rely on firms for which data is available for both the fiscal year before and the fiscal year after 
decimalization. The post-shock dummy (POST) equals 1 for the fiscal year after the 
decimalization, and zero for the fiscal year before the event. The regression models are estimated 
as follows. 
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14 Board independence is the proportion of independent directors on a board. The CEO duality dummy equals 1 if 
the CEO is also the chairman of the board, and 0 otherwise. The big auditor dummy equals 1 if the company is 
audited by one of the big auditors, and 0 otherwise. The actual number of big auditors has varied over time from 
eight during the 1980s, to four currently due to mergers and the dissolution of Arthur Andersen. The auditor industry 
specialization dummy equals 1 if the firm is audited by an industry specialist auditor, defined as the auditor with the 
largest market share among all auditors in the firm’s two-digit SIC industry code. 
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The notations are the same as in Equations (3a) and (3b). We report the results in Panel A of 
Table 5. Column (1) gives results for crash dummy, and Column (2) for negative skewness. For 
each measure, the coefficient for the post-shock dummy is positive and significant (z-statistic = 
2.434 and t-statistic = 4.136, respectively), suggesting that crash risk has increased in response to 
the liquidity-increasing shock. 
However, an increase in crash risk may be capturing the effects of other market-wide 
confounding events in 2001, rather than the effect of decimalization per se. To address this 
concern, we conduct two tests. In the first test, we adopt an identification approach suggested by 
Edmans, Fang, and Zur (2013), who note that moving from $1/16 to $1/100 increments is a 
greater proportional change for—and thus, should have a greater effect on—liquidity of low-
priced stocks. Consistent with this, they document that decimalization has a stronger effect on 
the liquidity of low-priced stocks. We create a low price dummy (LOWPRC) that is equal to one 
if a firm's closing stock price in the fiscal year prior to the decimalization was below the sample 
median, and zero otherwise. Next, we modify Equations 4(a) and 4(b) to include LOWPRC and 
the interaction term between POST and LOWPRC. We report the results in Panel A of Table 5. 
Column (3) gives results for crash dummy, and Column (4) for negative skewness. For each 
measure, the coefficient of the interaction term between POST and LOWPRC is positive and 
significant (z-statistic = 2.620 and t-statistic = 3.451, respectively), suggesting that an increase in 
crash risk following decimalization was more pronounced for the low-priced stocks. These 
findings confirm that the crash risk increase was attributable to decimalization.15  
                                                             
15  We perform several additional analyses (untabulated) to ensure the robustness of our results. None of the 
following has a major effect on regression results: including firm fixed instead of industry fixed effects in Equations 
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[Insert Table 5 about here] 
      In the second test, we compare the changes in crash risk around 2001 in the U.S. with those 
in major non-U.S. markets, which did not experience an event comparable to decimalization. We 
expect the changes in crash risk to be more positive for the U.S. market.16  The results are 
reported in Panel B of Table 5. For the U.S. market, the mean crash dummy increased by 0.044 
and the mean negative skewness increased by 0.118. For the non-U.S. markets, the average 
change in the mean crash dummy was 0.012 and the average change in the mean negative 
skewness was 0.037. More importantly, the difference between the change in crash risk in the 
U.S. market and that in the non-U.S. markets is positive and statistically significant for both 
measures of crash risk (t-statistics are 1.701 and 2.392 for crash dummy and negative skewness, 
respectively). We obtain similar (untabulated) results using median values. Overall, these 
findings are consistent with the view that the increase in crash risk around 2001 is driven by 
decimalization. Taken together, the totality of the evidence from our identification tests suggests 
a positive causal relation running from stock liquidity to stock price crash risk. 
 
V. Stock Liquidity and Crash Risk: Which Channel Matters? 
      Our baseline results suggest that higher stock liquidity leads to higher crash risk. As 
discussed in Sections I and II, such an effect can occur through the transient investor channel or 
through the blockholder channel. In this section, we develop several tests to evaluate which 
channel is more important in driving the stock liquidity-crash risk relation.  
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                    
4(a) and 4(b); using the number of crash weeks (instead of crash dummy) as the dependent variable in Columns (1) 
and (3) of Table 5; and examining a different positive shock to liquidity, the change in minimum tick size from $1/8 
to $1/16 in 1997 by the NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ (Fang, Tian, and Tice (2014)). 
16 We obtain the data used to construct crash risk measures for non-U.S. markets from Compustat Global and 
Datastream. Non-U.S. markets include Germany, France, Great Britain, Japan, and Italy.  
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A. Institutional Ownership and the Liquidity-Crash Relation 
The transient investor channel suggests that stock liquidity encourages the “cutting and 
running” type of selling by transient institutional investors upon bad news disclosures. This, in 
turn, may induce managers to withhold bad news, resulting in bad news accumulation and, 
consequently, an increased probability of a future crash. Thus, if the transient investor channel 
plays an important role in shaping the positive liquidity-crash relation, the effect of stock 
liquidity on future crash risk should be more pronounced for firms with a higher proportion of 
transient institutional ownership. In contrast, if liquidity influences crash risk mainly through the 
blockholder channel, the liquidity-crash relation should be stronger when blockholder ownership 
is higher. 
Prior studies suggest that institutional investors are a generally heterogeneous class, with 
many different types of investors who have differing investment horizons and monitoring 
intensities. We categorize institutions in two ways to account for this heterogeneity. We first 
categorize institutions as either transient (TRAIO) or non-transient (NONTRAIO) by following 
Bushee (1998), who classifies institutional investors using a factor analysis based on 
characteristics of past behavior (e.g., portfolio turnover, diversification, and momentum trading). 
Transient institutions are characterized as having high portfolio turnovers, highly diversified 
portfolio holdings, and a strong interest in short-term trading profits. Non-transient institutions 
include quasi-indexer and dedicated institutions, which are characterized as having low portfolio 
turnovers, monitoring firm management intensely, and relying on information beyond current 
earnings to assess managers’ performance (e.g., Gaspar, Massa, and Matos (2005), Fang, Tian, 
and Tice (2014)).17 Second, we partition institutions into blockholders and non-blockholders. 
                                                             
17 Quasi-indexers differ from dedicated institutions in that the former hold highly diversified portfolios and generally 
follow indexing and buy-and-hold investing strategies, while the latter have a high stockholding concentration and 
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Following prior research (e.g., Roosenboom, Schlingemann, and Vasconcelos (2014)), we define 
blockholders (BLOCK) as institutions that own more than 5% of a firm’s shares outstanding, and 
non-blockholders (NONBLOCK) as the remaining institutions. Edmans and Manso (2011) and 
Roosenboom, Schlingemann, and Vasconcelos (2014) argue that blockholders are typically 
dedicated and long-term-oriented institutional investors that monitor management via their threat 
of exit. They posit that non-blockholders consist mainly of short-term-oriented institutions that 
do not actively monitor or gather information.  
Table 6 shows our regression results. As a preliminary analysis, we first examine the effect 
of total institutional ownership on the stock liquidity-crash risk relation. We define total 
institutional ownership (IO) as the number of shares held by all institutional investors, divided by 
the total shares outstanding. In Panel A, we augment our baseline models by adding total 
institutional ownership and its interaction with stock liquidity. The coefficient of the interaction 
term is positive and significant in the crash dummy regression, and positive but insignificant in 
the negative skewness regression. These results provide some evidence that higher institutional 
ownership increases the positive effect of stock liquidity on crash risk.  
Next, to explore which type of institutions drives the documented effect, Panel B 
decomposes total institutional ownership into transient and non-transient, and interacts each 
ownership variable with stock liquidity. The results show that the coefficients of the interaction 
term between stock liquidity and transient institutional ownership are positive and statistically 
significant in both regressions (z-statistic = 2.186 and t-statistic = 2.535, respectively). This 
suggests that the effect of stock liquidity on future crash risk is stronger for firms held by more 
                                                                                                                                                                                                    
undertake more of a "relationship investing" role (Porter (1992)). Similar to dedicated institutions, however, quasi-
indexers are long-term-oriented. Recent studies show that they exert influence through proxy voting and by 
facilitating other blockholders’ activism (e.g., Appel, Gormley, and Keim (2015), Mullins (2014)). Untabulated 
robustness checks show our results are unaffected if we exclude quasi-indexers from non-transient institutions. 
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transient institutions, consistent with the transient investor channel. On the other hand, the 
interaction terms between stock liquidity and non-transient institutional ownership are 
insignificant in both regressions, suggesting that long-term-oriented institutions have no 
discernible impact on the liquidity-crash relation.18    
Panel C divides total institutional ownership into block and non-block ownership, and 
interacts them separately with stock liquidity. The results show that the interaction terms 
between stock liquidity and block ownership are insignificant. Thus, we find no evidence that the 
strength of the stock liquidity-crash risk relationship varies with the level of block ownership. In 
contrast, the coefficients of the interaction term between stock liquidity and non-block ownership 
are positive and significant in both regressions (z-statistic = 1.703 and t-statistic = 4.973, 
respectively). This suggests that the effect of liquidity on crash risk is stronger when firms are 
held by more non-blockholders, who are typically viewed as short-term-oriented investors. These 
findings provide further support for the transient investor channel, but not for the blockholder 
channel. 
[Insert Table 6 about here] 
B. Stock Liquidity and Future Bad News Releases 
Our second set of tests revolves around the link between stock liquidity and the intensity of 
bad news releases during crash weeks. Recall that transient investor channel implies 
accumulation of bad news over time, until the point when all bad news is released at once and 
crash occurs. Thus, if the documented liquidity-crash risk relation occurs through the transient 
investor channel, we should observe a higher intensity of very bad news releases during crash 
                                                             
18 As robustness tests, we classify institutional investors as short- or long-term using alternative measures of investor 
horizons proposed by Yan and Zhang (2009) and Derrien, Kecskes, and Thesmar (2013). We sort all institutional 
investors based on their average churn rate (i.e., portfolio turnover) over the past four quarters, as per Yan and Zhang 
(2009), and based on the fraction of their portfolios turned over during the past twelve quarters, as per Derrien, 
Kecskes, and Thesmar (2013). The (untabulated) results are qualitatively the same. 
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weeks than non-crash weeks. Further, and more importantly, we should observe a positive 
association between stock liquidity and the subsequent probability of unexpected very bad news 
releases. On the other hand, the blockholder channel implies a negative association between 
stock liquidity and the subsequent probability of unexpected very bad news releases. This is 
because higher liquidity enhances blockholders’ monitoring of firm management, which 
dissuades management underperformance to begin with, and encourages blockholders to gather 
information and trade on it, which limits manager’s ability to “pile up” bad news. 
For intensity of bad news releases, we examine whether the magnitude of negative 
unexpected earnings and the frequency of negative managerial earnings guidance are higher 
during crash weeks than non-crash weeks for both quarterly and annual earnings. We first 
identify firms that experienced crashes and announced earnings or released earnings guidance 
during crash weeks, and label them as crash firms. We then match each crash firm with a control 
firm that also announced earnings or released earnings guidance during the crash firm’s crash 
week, but did not experience a crash. The control firm is matched using propensity scores based 
on industry, market capitalization, and the market-to-book ratio in the previous month. Finally, 
for both crash and control firms, we compute unexpected earnings (UE), or the proportion of 
each type of earnings guidance (described below), and compare mean values across the two 
samples.  
We estimate quarterly unexpected earnings as a firm’s net income in the current quarter 
minus its net income for the same quarter in the previous fiscal year, scaled by its lagged market 
value of equity (Livnat and Mendenhall (2006)). We estimate annual unexpected earnings as a 
firm’s income before extraordinary items in the current year minus its income before 
extraordinary items in the previous fiscal year, scaled by its lagged market value of equity 
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(Kothari, Lewellen, and Warner (2006)).  
We classify earnings guidance into four categories: Shortfall, Meet, Beat, and Other. 
Shortfall refers to the announcement that the firm is not expected to meet the earnings target (that 
is, management’s prior expectation of earnings for the period). Meet means the firm will meet the 
target. Beat means the firm is expected to beat the target. Other means the firm provided earnings 
guidance, but did not specify its expectations precisely.  
We report the comparison results in Panel A of Table 7. The mean quarterly unexpected 
earnings for crash firms is negative and significant at the 1% level. In contrast, the mean 
unexpected earnings for control (non-crash) firms is not significantly different from zero. The 
difference between the two means is negative (-0.010) and significant at the 1% level (t-statistic 
= -4.132). The mean quarterly Shortfall for crash firms is 0.656 versus 0.309 for non-crash firms, 
and the difference is significant (t-statistic = 18.550). During crash weeks, crash firms also have 
significantly lower frequencies of meeting or beating earnings targets than non-crash firms. The 
results are qualitatively similar for the annual items. Collectively, these results suggest that a 
typical crash firm is characterized by a higher intensity of bad news releases than a non-crash 
firm.  
Next, we examine whether higher stock liquidity is associated with a higher or lower 
subsequent probability of unexpected very bad news releases. To that end, we construct two 
variables, SURP_UE and SURP_G. SURP_UE is a dummy variable that equals one if the firm’s 
unexpected earnings in the current fiscal year are in the bottom decile and its unexpected 
earnings in the previous fiscal year are non-negative, and zero otherwise. SURP_G is a dummy 
variable that equals one if a firm issued a Shortfall guidance in the current fiscal year but not in 
the previous fiscal year, and zero otherwise. The idea behind these variables is to identify firms 
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for which the release of very bad news was not expected based on firms’ prior announcements, 
and thus came as a surprise to the market. We then estimate the following regressions using the 
logit model: 
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We use the same control variables as in Equations (3a) and (3b). The results are in Panel B of 
Table 7. Column (1) shows results for the SURP_UE dummy; Column (2) shows results for the 
SURP_G dummy. For each variable, the coefficient for stock liquidity is positive and significant 
(smallest z-statistic = 5.293). The results suggest that stock liquidity is positively associated with 
the subsequent probability of unexpected very bad news releases.  
[Insert Table 7 about here] 
Collectively, the results in Table 7 indicate that crash weeks are characterized by a higher 
intensity of bad news releases than non-crash weeks, and that the subsequent probability of 
unexpected very bad news releases is higher for firms with higher stock liquidity. These findings 
provide further support for the transient investor channel, but are inconsistent with the 
blockholder channel. 
C. Stock Liquidity and Institutional Selling on Crash Weeks 
In our last set of tests, we explore whether stock liquidity leads to higher institutional selling 
on crash weeks, and if it does, which type of exit - the “cutting and running” type of exit by 
transient institutions or blockholders’ exit - drives the institutional selling on crash weeks. Both 
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the transient investor channel and the blockholder channel suggest that higher stock liquidity 
facilitates institutional selling when bad news about a firm is revealed. However, the difference 
lies in which type of institutions primarily contribute to the enhanced selling pressures. The 
“cutting and running” exit occurs when transient institutions reduce their stakes in a firm in 
response to bad news disclosures. Blockholders’ exit occurs when blockholders use their 
information advantage to make trading profits based on bad news disclosures.  
To begin with, we examine whether crash weeks are characterized by abnormal institutional 
selling. We use the standardized abnormal selling volume (SASV) measure proposed by 
Lakonishok and Vermaelen (1986), constructed as follows. For each stock, we define “normal” 
institutional selling volume (NSVOL) as the average number of shares sold by institutional 
investors in the [-9, -2] week window, for which week 0 is the crash week.19 To estimate weekly 
institutional selling volume (SVOL), we aggregate daily volume into weekly sums. The abnormal 
institutional selling volume (ASVOL) of stock i in week j for j = 1, 0, 1, 2, 3 is then written as: 
 (6)                                        
, ,
, .
i j i j
i j
i
SVOL NSVOL
ASVOL
NSVOL

   
Finally, the SASV for stock i in week j for j = 1, 0, 1, 2, 3 is computed as: 
(7)                                                
,
, ,
( )
i j
i j
i
ASVOL
SASV
ASVOL
   
where 𝜎(𝐴𝑆𝑉𝑂𝐿𝑖) is the standard deviation of abnormal volume computed between weeks 9 
and 2.  
                                                             
19 Following Barber, Odean, and Zhu (2009), we identify institutional selling if the total market value of shares sold 
in a transaction exceeds U.S. $50,000. Our sample starts in 1995 because of data restrictions from the vendor and 
ends in 2002 because of the increased popularity of high frequency trading afterward, which makes it difficult to 
identify institutional trading from trading size (Barber, Odean, and Zhu, 2009). Since we identify institutional selling 
by trading size, for this test we are unable to compute selling volume from various types of institutions. For 
robustness, we also use the standardized abnormal net selling volume (i.e., selling volume minus buying volume). 
The results (untabulated) are qualitatively similar.   
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Figure 3 depicts the mean SASV during weeks 1, 0, 1, 2, and 3 across all firms that 
experienced a stock price crash. The results show a positive and significant spike in mean SASV 
during week 0 (t-statistic = 2.340). The mean values are not significantly different from zero for 
weeks 1, 1, 2, and 3 (largest t-statistic = 0.961). These results suggest that crash weeks are 
characterized by abnormal institutional selling activity. 
[Insert Figure 3 about here] 
Next, we examine whether the abnormal institutional selling during crash weeks is stronger 
for higher liquidity firms. We estimate the following regression model: 
(8)                   
, 0 1 , 1 2 , 1 3 , 1 4 , 1
5 , 1 6 , 1 7 , 1 8 , 1 9 , 1
10 , 1 ,
 
.
i t i t i t i t i t
i t i t i t i t i t
i t i t i t
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    
 
   
    

    
    
   
 
We use the same control variables as in Equations (3a) and (3b). The results in Column (1) of 
Table 8 show that the coefficient for stock liquidity is positive and significant (t-statistic = 
8.056). This suggests that, on average, the abnormal institutional selling activity during crash 
weeks is more intense for firms with higher stock liquidity. These results indicate that 
institutional selling plays an important role in driving the stock liquidity-crash risk relation. 
As discussed above, higher stock liquidity may facilitate institutional selling by enhancing 
the response of transient institutional investors to bad news releases (“cutting and running”), or 
by facilitating blockholders’ exit. Thus, finally we attempt to identify which type of exit 
predominantly drives the relation between stock liquidity and abnormal institutional selling 
during crash weeks.  
We report the results for these tests in Columns (2) - (4) of Table 8. Column (2) shows the 
results for the ownership of all institutional investors; Column (3) shows results for the division 
between transient and non-transient institutions; and Column (4) shows results for the division 
34 
 
between blockholders and non-blockholders. Column (2) reveals that the coefficient for the 
interaction term between total institutional ownership and stock liquidity is not significant in the 
regression. More importantly, Column (3) indicates that the coefficient for the interaction term 
between transient institutional ownership and stock liquidity is positive and significant (t-statistic 
= 2.428). Column (4) shows that the coefficient for the interaction term between non-blockholder 
institutional ownership and stock liquidity is positive and significant (t-statistic = 2.277). 
Interestingly, the interaction term between blockholder ownership and stock liquidity is negative 
and significant at the 10% level (t-statistic = 1.700), suggesting that liquidity discourages 
blockholders from selling upon public bad news. A potential explanation for this result is that 
stock liquidity encourages blockholders to gather private information, and thus trade more 
aggressively on private rather than public signals. Overall, we find no evidence that the effect of 
stock liquidity on crash risk is amplified for firms with higher block ownership, or for those with 
a higher proportion of non-transient institutions.  
[Insert Table 8 about here] 
To summarize, these results suggest that institutional exit is important in shaping the relation 
between stock liquidity and crash risk. They also suggest that institutional exit on crash weeks 
occurs primarily through the selling activities of transient institutions or non-blockholders, rather 
than through that of blockholders. Collectively, our results in Section V are consistent with stock 
liquidity positively affecting crash risk through increasing short-termism-induced managerial bad 
news hoarding, and through facilitating transient institutional exits in response to bad news 
releases. 
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VI. Conclusions 
Stock price crashes can severely damage investors’ welfare and confidence. Using a large 
sample of U.S. firms for 1993-2010, we find that higher stock liquidity gives rise to higher crash 
risk. To understand the mechanisms underlying this effect, we explore both ex ante and ex post 
channels. Our analysis suggests that high stock liquidity induces short-termist pressure and 
increases managers’ ex ante incentives to withhold bad news. Moreover, high liquidity facilitates 
the exit of transient institutions, thus magnifying the ex post stock price reactions to bad news 
releases. 
Our results suggest that stock liquidity can increase managers’ incentives to withhold bad 
news and weaken financial market stability. Nonetheless, given that prior literature has 
documented various beneficial effects of stock liquidity on corporate governance, information 
environment, and firm value (Holden, Jacobsen, and Subrahmanyam (2014)), we do not 
conclude that stock liquidity is on balance a negative attribute. Rather, it has both positive and 
negative effects, and our study identifies one negative side — its effect on crash risk through the 
transient investor channel. Thus, our results further emphasize the need for regulators to 
determine the optimal level of stock liquidity based on the trade-off between its’ various benefits 
and costs.  
Finally, prior research (e.g., Ang, Chen, and Xing (2006), Chang, Christoffersen, and Jacobs 
(2013)) documents a significant risk premium for downside risk. However, the documented 
effect of liquidity on crash risk does not necessarily imply that more liquid stocks should have 
higher expected returns. Rather, our findings suggest that, to understand the net effect of liquidity 
on expected stock returns, one may need to consider not only its beneficial aspects (e.g., Amihud 
and Mendelson (1986)), but also its effect on crash risk. We leave this issue for future research.  
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Appendix A. Variable Definitions 
Note: Variable names in parentheses in the right column refer to the names of the data items in the merged 
Compustat/CRSP database.  
 
Variable Definition 
ACCM 
Moving sum of the absolute value of annual discretionary accruals over the prior three 
years, where accruals are calculated using the modified Jones model of Dechow, Sloan, 
and Sweeney (1995). 
CRASH 
Dummy variable equal to 1 for one or more weekly returns falling 3.09 standard 
deviations below the mean weekly returns over the fiscal year, and 0 otherwise.  
DISP 
Standard deviation of analysts’ earnings-per-share forecasts divided by the mean of 
analysts’ forecasts. 
DTURN 
Average monthly stock turnovers over the current fiscal year minus those over the 
previous fiscal year. Monthly stock turnover is calculated as the ratio of monthly trading 
volume over the number of shares outstanding.  
LEV Ratio of long-term debt (DLTT) over the book value of total assets (AT). 
LIQ 
100 times the relative effective spread, which is the ratio of the absolute value of the 
difference between the trade price and the midpoint of the bid-ask quote over the trade 
price.  
LOWPRC 
Dummy variable equal to one if a firm's closing stock price in the fiscal year prior to the 
decimalization was below the sample median, and zero otherwise.
MB 
Ratio of the market value of equity over the book value of equity (CEQ). Market value of 
equity is the product of stock price (PRCC_F) and the number of shares outstanding 
(CSHPRI).  
NSKEW 
Ratio of the third moment of firm-specific weekly returns over the standard deviation of 
firm-specific weekly returns raised to the third power, and then multiplied by 1. 
POST 
Dummy variable equal to 1 for the fiscal year after the decimalization, and zero for the 
fiscal year before the event. 
RET 100 times the mean of firm-specific weekly returns over the fiscal year. 
ROA Ratio of income before extraordinary items (IB) over book value of total assets (AT). 
SASV 
Abnormal weekly institutional selling volume deflated by the standard deviation of 
abnormal selling volume over the [-9,-2] week period. 
SI Ratio of the number of shares held short over the number of shares outstanding. 
SIGMA Standard deviation of firm-specific weekly returns over the fiscal year.  
SIZE Log value of the market value of equity.  
IO 
 
Proportion of shares held by institutional investors. We classify further into TRAIO, the 
proportion held by transient institutional investors, NONTRAIO, the proportion held by 
non-transient institutional investors, BLOCK, the proportion held by institutional 
blockholders, and NONBLOCK, the proportion held by non-blockholders.   
SURP_UE 
Dummy variable equal to 1 if the unexpected earnings are in the lowest decile for the 
current fiscal year and non-negative in the previous fiscal year, and 0 otherwise. 
SURP_G 
Dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm released a Shortfall guidance in the current fiscal 
year but not in the previous fiscal year, and 0 otherwise. For firms with no recorded 
earnings guidance, the variable equals 0.  
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Figure 1. Predictions regarding the effect of stock liquidity on crash risk. 
 
Stock liquidity can impact crash risk if it affects at least one of the following three items: the likelihood of 
bad news formation, the extent of managerial bad news hoarding, and the strength of the market response 
to bad news releases. Based on prior research on stock liquidity, we consider two relevant theories for the 
effects of stock liquidity on crash risk, i.e., governance theory and short-termism theory. Governance 
theory predicts that higher stock liquidity encourages investors’ information production and informed 
trading, and enhances blockholders’ incentive and capability to monitor firms. Short-termism theory 
suggests that stock liquidity attracts transient investors and induces managers to engage in short-termist 
behavior. The predictions of the two theories regarding the effects of stock liquidity on the three crash risk 
items are listed in the table. “Increase” (“Decrease”) indicates that higher stock liquidity increases 
(decreases) the extent of the crash risk item. “N.A.” indicates that there is no clear prediction.  
“Ambiguous” indicates that the net effect of stock liquidity on the crash risk item is unclear because of 
conflicting predictions. The last column summarizes the net effect of stock liquidity on crash risk for each 
theory. 
 
 Bad news 
formation 
Bad news 
hoarding 
Market response to  
bad news releases 
 
Net effect  
on crash risk 
(1) Governance theory Decrease Decrease Ambiguous Ambiguous 
     
(2) Short-termism theory N.A. Increase Increase Increase 
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Figure 2. Plot of Crash Risk Measures for Stock Liquidity Deciles 
This figure presents the mean values of crash risk measures for raw and residual stock liquidity deciles 
(from lowest to highest). Stock liquidity (LIQ) is defined as -100 times relative effective spread, which is 
the ratio of the absolute difference between the trade price and the midpoint of the bid-ask quote over the 
trade price. Residual stock liquidity is the residual from regressing stock liquidity against firm size 
(SIZE). Crash dummy (CRASH) is defined as a dummy variable, which is equal to one if there is one or 
more weekly returns falling 3.09 standard deviations below the mean weekly returns over the fiscal year, 
and zero otherwise. Negative skewness (NSKEW) is the ratio of the third moment of firm-specific weekly 
returns over the standard deviation of firm-specific weekly returns raised to the third power, and then 
multiplied by -1.  
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Figure 3. Plot of Institutional Selling Activity around Crash Weeks 
This figure presents the institutional standardized abnormal selling volume around stock price crash 
weeks. The sample consists of firm-years jointly covered in the merged Compustat/CRSP database and 
TAQ between 1995 and 2002. The standardized abnormal selling volume (SASV) is the abnormal weekly 
institutional selling volume deflated by the standard deviation of abnormal selling volume over the [-9,-2] 
week period. 
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Table 1. Distribution by Year for Key Variables 
This table presents the sample distribution by year and mean values of the crash risk measures, stock 
liquidity, and firm-specific stock returns on crash weeks for each year. The sample consists of firm-years 
jointly covered in the merged Compustat/CRSP database and TAQ between 1993 and 2010. Stock 
liquidity (LIQ) is defined as -100 times relative effective spread, which is the ratio of the absolute 
difference between the trade price and the midpoint of the bid-ask quote over the trade price. Crash 
dummy (CRASH) is defined as a dummy variable, which is equal to one if there is one or more weekly 
returns falling 3.09 standard deviations below the mean weekly returns over the fiscal year, and zero 
otherwise. Negative skewness (NSKEW) is the ratio of the third moment of firm-specific weekly returns 
over the standard deviation of firm-specific weekly returns raised to the third power, and then multiplied 
by negative one. Firm-specific stock returns on crash weeks are the raw residual weekly returns calculated 
using Equation (1). All variables are winsorized at both the 1st and 99th percentiles.  
 
Year Obs. CRASH NSKEW LIQ 
Residual Return 
On Crash Weeks 
1993 2,531 0.148 -0.060  -1.210  -0.220 
1994 2,755 0.148 -0.055  -1.209  -0.219 
1995 2,961 0.142 -0.089  -1.125  -0.216 
1996 3,202 0.147 -0.083  -1.093  -0.242 
1997 3,308 0.161 -0.069  -0.936  -0.262 
1998 3,423 0.180 0.000  -0.874  -0.282 
1999 3,359 0.153 -0.075  -0.842  -0.306 
2000 3,330 0.185 0.052  -0.859  -0.352 
2001 3,182 0.184 0.080  -0.647  -0.297 
2002 3,149 0.229 0.170  -0.567  -0.293 
2003 3,247 0.180 -0.033  -0.423  -0.213 
2004 3,359 0.207 0.003  -0.358  -0.206 
2005 3,225 0.228 0.018  -0.302  -0.189 
2006 3,658 0.220 -0.003  -0.275  -0.184 
2007 3,605 0.213 0.031  -0.263  -0.204 
2008 3,513 0.260 0.213  -0.487  -0.298 
2009 3,325 0.193 0.015  -0.490  -0.256 
2010 3,401 0.181 -0.022  -0.345  -0.184 
Total 58,533 0.188 0.008  -0.664  -0.247 
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Table 2. Summary Statistics and Correlation Matrix 
This table presents the summary statistics and correlation matrix. The sample consists of firm-years jointly covered in the merged 
Compustat/CRSP database and TAQ between 1993 and 2010. Stock liquidity (LIQ) is defined as -100 times relative effective spread, which is the 
ratio of the absolute difference between the trade price and the midpoint of the bid-ask quote over the trade price. Crash dummy (CRASH) is 
defined as a dummy variable, which is equal to one if there is one or more weekly returns falling 3.09 standard deviations below the mean weekly 
returns over the fiscal year, and zero otherwise. Negative skewness (NSKEW) is -1 times the skewness of weekly returns over the fiscal year. Other 
variable definitions are in Appendix A. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
Panel A. Summary Statistics 
 Mean S.D. 5% 25% Median 75% 95% 
CRASH 0.188 0.391 0.000  0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000  
NSKEW 0.008 0.762 -1.140  -0.417 -0.028 0.372 1.310  
LIQ -0.664 0.826 -2.360 -0.907 -0.332 -0.112 -0.037  
SIGMA 0.057 0.031 0.020  0.034 0.050 0.072 0.117  
RET -0.206 0.250 -0.671  -0.255 -0.123 -0.057 -0.019  
DTURN 0.006 0.103 -0.129  -0.021 0.001 0.028 0.154  
SIZE 6.066 2.040 2.961  4.554 5.949 7.400 9.713  
MB 2.801 4.478 0.476  1.178 1.898 3.250 8.561  
LEV 0.174 0.190 0.000  0.005 0.120 0.280 0.537  
ROA 0.011 0.184 -0.307  -0.003 0.038 0.086 0.198  
ACCM 0.358 0.346 0.043  0.135 0.259 0.463 0.787  
 
Panel B. Correlation Matrix 
 CRASH NSKEW LIQ SIGMA RET DTURN SIZE MB LEV ROA ACCM 
CRASH 1.000           
NSKEW 0.622*** 1.000          
LIQ 0.066*** 0.099*** 1.000         
SIGMA 0.102*** 0.059*** -0.339*** 1.000        
RET -0.076*** -0.023*** 0.284*** -0.950*** 1.000       
DTURN 0.030*** 0.023*** 0.046*** 0.138*** -0.163*** 1.000      
SIZE 0.017*** 0.083*** 0.560*** -0.468*** 0.376*** 0.034*** 1.000     
MB -0.032*** -0.032*** 0.086*** 0.043*** -0.053*** 0.061*** -0.058*** 1.000    
LEV -0.007* 0.001 0.066*** -0.056*** 0.047*** 0.014*** 0.239*** -0.085*** 1.000   
ROA -0.013*** -0.005 0.134*** -0.375*** 0.377*** 0.039*** 0.219*** -0.032*** -0.057*** 1.000  
ACCM 0.019*** 0.015*** -0.001 0.263*** -0.239*** 0.001 -0.188*** 0.090*** -0.024*** -0.191*** 1.000 
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Table 3. Stock Liquidity and Crash Risk: Main Results 
This table presents regression results for the relation between stock liquidity and crash risk. The sample 
consists of firm-years jointly covered in the merged Compustat/CRSP database and TAQ between 1993 
and 2010. Stock liquidity (LIQ) is defined as -100 times relative effective spread, which is the ratio of the 
absolute difference between the trade price and the midpoint of the bid-ask quote over the trade price. 
Crash dummy (CRASH) is defined as a dummy variable, which is equal to one if there is one or more 
weekly returns falling 3.09 standard deviations below the mean weekly returns over the fiscal year, and 
zero otherwise. Negative skewness (NSKEW) is -1 times the skewness of weekly returns over the fiscal 
year. Other variable definitions are in Appendix A. All variables are winsorized the variables at both the 
1st and 99th percentiles. The constant term, industry fixed-effects based on two-digit SIC codes, and year 
fixed-effects are included in the regressions. The regression in Column (1) is estimated using logit; that in 
Column (2) is estimated using OLS. z(t)-statistics (in parentheses) are computed using standard errors 
robust to both clustering at the firm level and heteroskedasticity. *, **, and *** denote statistical 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
 CRASHt NSKEWt 
 
(1) (2) 
LIQ t-1 0.216*** 0.057*** 
 (7.439) (9.008) 
NSKEW t-1 0.055*** 0.022*** 
 (3.423) (4.176) 
SIGMA t-1 7.102*** 5.231*** 
 (4.345) (11.745) 
RET t-1 0.980*** 0.574*** 
 (4.880) (11.094) 
DTURN t-1 0.448*** 0.207*** 
 (3.805) (5.743) 
SIZE t-1 0.015 0.045*** 
 (1.540) (16.040) 
MB t-1 0.008*** 0.004*** 
 (2.957) (5.048) 
LEV t-1 -0.034 -0.012 
 (-0.467) (-0.539) 
ROA t-1 -0.313*** -0.124*** 
 (-4.074) (-4.707) 
ACCM t-1 0.079** 0.023* 
 (2.055) (1.792) 
Obs./ R
2
 48,176/0.021  48,176/0.041 
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Table 4. Stock Liquidity and Crash Risk: Additional Analysis 
This table presents the results for the robustness tests. The sample consists of firm-years jointly covered 
in the merged Compustat/CRSP database and TAQ between 1993 and 2010. Stock liquidity (LIQ) is 
defined as -100 times relative effective spread, which is the ratio of the absolute difference between the 
trade price and the midpoint of the bid-ask quote over the trade price. Crash dummy (CRASH) is defined 
as a dummy variable, which is equal to one if there is one or more weekly returns falling 3.09 standard 
deviations below the mean weekly returns over the fiscal year, and zero otherwise. Negative skewness 
(NSKEW) is -1 times the skewness of weekly returns over the fiscal year. Other variable definitions are in 
Appendix A. The constant terms, control variables, industry fixed-effects based on two-digit SIC codes, 
and year fixed-effects are included in all regressions. z(t)-statistics (in parentheses) are computed using 
standard errors robust to both clustering at the firm level and heteroskedasticity. *, **, and *** denote 
statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
Coefficients of Stock Liquidity CRASHt NSKEWt 
 (1) (2) 
Panel A: Alternative definitions of crash risk   
(1) 3.5 standard deviations below the mean 0.213*** - 
 (7.241) - 
(2) 4 standard deviations below the mean 0.182*** - 
 (7.352) - 
(3) 4.5 standard deviations below the mean 0.181*** - 
 (7.346) - 
(4) Firm-specific return below -10% 0.237*** - 
 (6.869) - 
(5) Firm-specific return below -15% 0.215*** - 
 (6.986) - 
(6) Firm-specific return below -20% 0.203*** - 
 (7.373) - 
(7) No. of crash weeks as the dependent variable 0.026*** - 
 (7.648) - 
Panel B: Alternative stock liquidity measures   
(1) Amihud (2002) price impact 0.002*** 0.001*** 
 (6.439) (10.250) 
(2) Hasbrouck (2009) implicit bid-ask spread 0.191*** 0.043*** 
 (7.613) (7.508) 
(3) Lesmond (2005) percentage of zero returns 0.022*** 0.009*** 
 (7.778) (11.208) 
Panel C: Additional controls   
(1) Including firm fixed-effects 0.122*** 0.036*** 
 (2.749) (2.812) 
(2) Including additional control variables 0.733*** 0.145** 
 (2.633) (2.435) 
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Table 5. Stock Liquidity and Crash Risk: Tests on 2001 Decimalization  
This table presents the results of changes in crash risk around the 2001 decimalization. The sample 
consists of firm-years jointly covered in the merged Compustat/CRSP database and TAQ between 1993 
and 2010. Stock liquidity (LIQ) is defined as -100 times relative effective spread, which is the ratio of the 
absolute difference between the trade price and the midpoint of the bid-ask quote over the trade price. 
Crash dummy (CRASH) is defined as a dummy variable, which is equal to one if there is one or more 
weekly returns falling 3.09 standard deviations below the mean weekly returns over the fiscal year, and 
zero otherwise. Negative skewness (NSKEW) is -1 times the skewness of weekly returns over the fiscal 
year. POST equals one for the fiscal year after the decimalization, and zero for the fiscal year before the 
decimalization. LOWPRC equals one if a firm's closing stock price in the fiscal year prior to the 
decimalization was below the sample median and zero otherwise. Other variable definitions are in 
Appendix A. The constant term and industry fixed-effects based on two-digit SIC codes are included in all 
the regressions in Panel A. The regressions in Columns (1) and (3) are estimated using a logit model; 
those in Columns (2) and (4) are estimated using OLS. z(t)-statistics (in parentheses) are computed using 
standard errors robust to both clustering at the firm level and heteroskedasticity. *, **, and *** denote 
statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
 
Panel A. Regression analysis 
 CRASHt NSKEWt CRASHt NSKEWt 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
POSTt 0.182** 0.095*** 0.023 0.018 
 (2.434) (4.136) (0.209) (0.534) 
POSTt×LOWPRC   0.186*** 0.153*** 
   (2.620) (3.451) 
LOWPRC   -0.059 -0.055 
   (-1.268) (-1.512) 
NSKEW t-1 0.043 0.017 0.027 0.011 
 (0.827) (0.932) (0.518) (0.580) 
SIGMA t-1 7.520 6.685*** 8.714* 7.160*** 
 (1.564) (4.647) (1.789) (4.931) 
RET t-1 0.640 0.582*** 0.752 0.626*** 
 (1.142) (3.587) (1.326) (3.828) 
DTURN t-1 0.331 0.196* 0.206 0.144 
 (0.969) (1.654) (0.602) (1.211) 
SIZE t-1 0.092*** 0.073*** 0.087*** 0.071*** 
 (4.192) (10.789) (3.499) (9.317) 
MB t-1 0.017** 0.004* 0.017** 0.004* 
 (2.317) (1.649) (2.404) (1.749) 
LEV t-1 0.470** 0.170** 0.471** 0.171** 
 (2.182) (2.394) (2.178) (2.401) 
ROA t-1 0.100 0.037 0.134 0.050 
 (0.465) (0.496) (0.624) (0.667) 
ACCM t-1 0.310*** 0.079* 0.313*** 0.078* 
 (2.872) (1.864) (2.879) (1.861) 
Obs./R
2
 4,546/0.026 4,546/0.050  4,546/0.028 4,546/0.052 
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Panel B. Difference-in-difference analysis 
 Before  After  Change t-statistic 
CRASH      
Mean CRASH  (U.S. market) 0.185 0.229 0.044*** (4.278) 
Mean CRASH  (non-U.S. markets)  0.180 0.192 0.012* (1.836) 
Difference-in-difference    0.032* (1.701) 
NSKEW     
Mean NSKEW  (U.S. market) 0.052 0.170 0.118*** (6.158) 
Mean NSKEW  (non-U.S. markets)  -0.098 -0.061 0.037** (2.490) 
Difference-in-difference    0.081** (2.392) 
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Table 6. Stock Liquidity and Crash Risk: The Role of Institutional Investors  
This table presents the results regarding the effects of institutional ownership on the liquidity-crash 
relation. The sample consists of firm-years jointly covered in the merged Compustat/CRSP database and 
TAQ between 1993 and 2010. Stock liquidity (LIQ) is defined as -100 times relative effective spread, 
which is the ratio of the absolute difference between the trade price and the midpoint of the bid-ask quote 
over the trade price. Crash dummy (CRASH) is defined as a dummy variable, which is equal to one if 
there is one or more weekly returns falling 3.09 standard deviations below the mean weekly returns over 
the fiscal year, and zero otherwise. Negative skewness (NSKEW) is -1 times the skewness of weekly 
returns over the fiscal year. IO, TRAIO, NONTRAIO, BLOCK, and NONBLOCK are total institutional 
ownership, transient institutional ownership, non-transient institutional ownership, blockholder 
ownership, and non-blockholder ownership, respectively. The constant term, control variables, industry 
fixed-effects based on two-digit SIC codes, and year fixed-effects are included in all the regressions. The 
regressions in Column (1) are estimated using a logit model; those in Column (2) are estimated using 
OLS. z(t)-statistics (in parentheses) are computed using standard errors robust to both clustering at the 
firm level and heteroskedasticity. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% 
levels, respectively. 
 
 CRASHt NSKEWt 
 (1) (2) 
Panel A: The effect of total institutional ownership (N = 48,176) 
LIQ t-1 0.099*** 0.036*** 
 (3.181) (5.017) 
LIQ t-1×IOt-1 0.233** 0.021 
 (2.514) (0.927) 
IOt-1 0.598*** 0.180*** 
 (10.078) (10.640) 
Panel B: The effects of transient and non-transient institutional ownership (N = 48,176) 
LIQ t-1 0.098*** 0.036*** 
 (3.145) (4.995) 
LIQ t-1×TRAIOt-1 0.142** 0.171** 
 (2.186) (2.535) 
TRAIOt-1 1.397*** 0.657*** 
 (9.025) (12.722) 
LIQ t-1×NONTRAIOt-1 0.382 0.061 
 (1.436) (0.827) 
NONTRAIOt-1 0.281 -0.002 
 (1.478) (-0.068) 
Panel C: The effects of block and non-block ownership (N = 48,176) 
LIQ t-1 0.139*** 0.044*** 
 (4.189) (5.988) 
LIQ t-1×NONBLOCKt-1 0.105* 0.198*** 
 (1.703) (4.973) 
NONBLOCKt-1 0.777*** 0.220*** 
 (10.009) (9.848) 
LIQ t-1×BLOCKt-1 0.002 0.010 
 (0.016) (0.291) 
BLOCKt-1 0.115 0.048 
 (1.023) (1.432) 
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Table 7. Stock Liquidity, Stock Price Crashes, and Bad News Releases 
This table presents the results of the tests on bad news releases during crash weeks. The sample consists 
of firm-years jointly covered in the merged Compustat/CRSP database and TAQ between 1993 and 2010. 
Stock liquidity (LIQ) is defined as -100 times relative effective spread, which is the ratio of the absolute 
difference between the trade price and the midpoint of the bid-ask quote over the trade price. Crash 
dummy (CRASH) is defined as a dummy variable, which is equal to one if there is one or more weekly 
returns falling 3.09 standard deviations below the mean weekly returns over the fiscal year, and zero 
otherwise. Negative skewness (NSKEW) is -1 times the skewness of weekly returns over the fiscal year. 
Crash weeks are identified if weekly returns fall 3.09 standard deviations below the mean weekly returns 
over the fiscal year. Crash firms are matched with control firms in the same industry and with the closest 
market capitalization and the book-to-market ratio. Stock liquidity (LIQ) is defined as -100 times relative 
effective spread, which is the ratio of the difference between the trade price and the midpoint of the bid-
ask quote over the trade price. Quarterly UE is a firm’s net income in the current quarter minus its net 
income for the same quarter in the previous fiscal year, scaled by its lagged market value of equity. 
Annual UE is a firm’s income before extraordinary items in the current year minus its income before 
extraordinary items in the previous fiscal year, scaled by its lagged market value of equity. Shortfall, 
Meet, and Beat refer to the announcement that a firm is expected to fall short of, meet, or beat their 
earnings targets, respectively. Other indicates cases where an earnings target is not mentioned. The 
constant term, industry fixed-effects based on two-digit SIC codes, and year fixed-effects are included in 
the logit regressions reported in Panel B. z-statistics (in parentheses) are computed using standard errors 
robust to both clustering at the firm level and heteroskedasticity. *, **, and *** denote statistical 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
Panel A: News releases for crash versus non-crash firms 
 Crash firms Control firms Difference t-statistics 
Quarterly Items 
Mean UE (N = 3,111) -0.011*** -0.001 -0.010*** (-4.132) 
Guidance (N = 1,236)     
%Shortfall 0.656 0.309 0.346*** (18.550) 
%Meet 0.122 0.327 -0.205*** (-12.623) 
%Beat 0.018 0.129 -0.110*** (-10.763) 
%Other 0.203 0.233 -0.030 (-1.220) 
Annual Items 
Mean UE (N = 8,492) -0.062*** -0.024** -0.037*** (-7.444) 
Guidance (N = 974)     
%Shortfall 0.571 0.1797 0.392*** (19.531) 
%Meet 0.281 0.500 -0.218*** (-10.139) 
%Beat 0.031 0.194 -0.162*** (-11.688) 
%Other 0.115 0.126 -0.011 (0.560) 
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Panel B: Stock liquidity and bad news releases 
 SURP_UEt SURP_Gt 
 
(1) (2) 
LIQ t-1 0.221*** 1.692*** 
 (5.293) (7.402) 
NSKEW t-1 -0.153*** 0.139*** 
 (-5.855) (3.792) 
SIGMA t-1 47.878*** 6.128 
 (16.759) (1.206) 
RET t-1 3.265*** 0.216 
 (10.372) (0.282) 
DTURN t-1 0.444** 1.079*** 
 (2.436) (3.749) 
SIZE t-1 -0.108*** 0.011 
 (-5.879) (0.432) 
MB t-1 0.013** -0.016** 
 (2.262) (-2.214) 
LEV t-1 -0.577*** 0.310* 
 (-4.019) (1.784) 
ROA t-1 3.091*** 1.423*** 
 (13.132) (4.909) 
ACCM t-1 0.606*** 0.199* 
 (10.654) (1.875) 
Obs./ R
2
 47,885/0.144  21,272/0.090 
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Table 8. Institutional Abnormal Selling around Crash Weeks 
This table gives the results of the tests for the effects of stock liquidity on abnormal institutional selling around 
stock price crash weeks. The sample consists of firm-years jointly covered in the merged Compustat/CRSP 
database and TAQ between 1995 and 2002. Stock liquidity (LIQ) is defined as -100 times relative effective 
spread, which is the ratio of the absolute difference between the trade price and the midpoint of the bid-ask 
quote over the trade price. The dependent variable (SASV) is the abnormal weekly institutional selling volume 
deflated by the standard deviation of abnormal selling volume over the [-9,-2] week period. Other variable 
definitions are in Appendix A. The constant term, industry fixed-effects based on two-digit SIC codes, and year 
fixed-effects are included in all the regressions, which are performed by OLS. t-statistics (in parentheses) are 
computed using standard errors robust to both clustering at the firm level and heteroskedasticity. *, **, and *** 
denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
 
Dependent Variable: SASVt (1)  (2) (3) (4) 
LIQ t-1 2.248*** 1.736*** 1.670*** 1.856*** 
 (8.056) (5.758) (5.477) (5.551) 
LIQ t-1×IOt-1  -0.092   
  (-0.091)   
IOt-1  3.765***   
  (3.997)   
LIQ t-1×TRAIOt-1   0.528**  
   (2.428)  
TRAIOt-1   6.012**  
   (2.375)  
LIQ t-1×NONTRAIOt-1   -3.592  
   (-1.050)  
NONTRAIOt-1   2.544  
   (1.091)  
LIQ t-1×BLOCKt-1    -3.807* 
    (-1.700) 
BLOCKt-1    2.189 
    (0.864) 
LIQ t-1×NONBLOCKt-1    3.243** 
    (2.277) 
NONBLOCKt-1    3.781*** 
    (2.901) 
NSKEW t-1 0.090 0.021 0.063 0.024 
 (0.378) (0.085) (0.259) (0.098) 
SIGMA t-1 128.555*** 120.077*** 105.889*** 115.755*** 
 (6.652) (6.232) (5.389) (5.911) 
RET t-1 12.504*** 11.440*** 10.307*** 11.090*** 
 (5.955) (5.450) (4.888) (5.180) 
DTURN t-1 0.934 0.383 -0.016 0.064 
 (0.573) (0.236) (-0.010) (0.039) 
SIZE t-1 0.805*** 0.698*** 0.702*** 0.665*** 
 (5.853) (4.932) (4.948) (4.263) 
MB t-1 0.058 0.068 0.061 0.068 
 (1.117) (1.331) (1.181) (1.316) 
LEV t-1 2.582** 2.246* 2.299* 2.350** 
 (2.139) (1.884) (1.927) (1.993) 
ROA t-1 1.129 0.817 0.662 0.873 
 (1.033) (0.747) (0.608) (0.783) 
ACCM t-1 0.142 0.258 0.199 0.281 
 (0.245) (0.451) (0.349) (0.485) 
Obs./ R
2
 3,586/0.100 3,586/0.106 3,586/0.108 3,568/0.107 
 
